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Abstract
This thesis provides an explanation for the coexistence of regular free parking and paid
valet parking in some shopping malls. The varying socio-economic levels of customers, their
differing valuations of the goods sold at the mall, and an extra utility associated with valet
service are the immediate reasons for the emergence of valet parking at the mall. We provide
a theory based on the latter two reasons to analyze parking decisions of customers and the
pricing strategy of shopping malls. Based on the sorting of different kinds of customers
between valet and regular parking, various parking regimes can emerge at the mall including
regular parking only, valet parking only, and mixed regimes of the two.
v
VALE PARK MODELLEMES˙I
Gökmen Öz
Ekonomi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014
Tez Danıs¸manı: Eren ˙Inci
Anahtar Kelimeler: Alıs¸veris¸ Merkezi; Banliyö; Park Bütçesi; Park Ücreti; Vale Park.
Özet
Bu tezde, s¸ehir merkezinin dıs¸ında kalan alıs¸veris¸ merkezlerindeki ücretsiz otopark ve
ücretli vale park uygulamasının ortaya çıkıs¸ı ve açıklamaları incelenmektedir. Müs¸terilerin
alıs¸veris¸ merkezinde satılan ürünlere farklı deg˘er biçmeleri, farklı zenginlik seviyeleri ve
vale park kullanmaktan elde edilen fayda; vale parkın ortaya çıkıs¸ı için sunulabilecek açık-
lamalardır. Bu saydıg˘ımız nedenlerden, modelde ilk ikisine odaklanıyoruz. Bu açıklamaları
kullanarak müs¸terilerin park kararlarını ve alıs¸veris¸ merkezlerinin fiyat stratejilerini açıklıy-
oruz. Modelde kullandıg˘ımız çes¸itle deg˘is¸kenlere (otopark masrafı, vale masrafı, vale park
kullanmaktan alınan fayda) bag˘lı olarak farklı rejimler olus¸abilir. Bunlar bütün müs¸terilere
sadece otopark sunulan, sadece vale park hizmeti sunulan, ya da müs¸teriler kategorize edil-
erek bir kısma vale park, dig˘erine otopark sunulan ve hatta bazı durumlarda fiyatları iyice
artırarak belli müs¸terilerin alıs¸veris¸ merkezine gelmemesini sag˘layan rejimlerdir.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the parking behavior of shopping mall customers and the pricing strategy of
shopping malls by providing an extension of the base model developed by Hasker and Inci
(forthcoming). A typical shopping mall allocates 4   6 parking spaces per 1; 000 sq. ft.
of gross leasable area (International Council of Shopping Centers and Urban Land Insti-
tute, 2003; henceforth, ICSC and ULI, 2003), which means that shopping malls allocate
more space to parking than to stores. Considering also the facts that there are approximately
109; 500 shopping centers in the United States ranging in size from the small convenience
centers to the large super-regional malls and that these centers share over half of total retail
sales in the US with $2:26 trillion (ICSC, 2003), we can say that shopping malls substan-
tially contribute to parking capacity as well as the economy. Thus, an analysis of parking
at shopping malls is vital. In addition, we classify shopping malls as urban and suburban.
Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) define a shopping mall as suburban if its parking lot is not
used as a parking garage but used by customers who visit the mall for shopping, otherwise
it is urban. In urban areas, the malls may have an incentive to charge for parking in order to
prevent people from using a parking lot as a free parking garage. In order to eliminate this
external factor on urban malls, we focus on suburban malls where the only way to get to the
mall is by car.
As one of the most important intermediate goods in the modern market economy, park-
ing has been an increasingly significant topic in economics, especially after the early 1990s.
Before that, urban planners were decisive in policy making. They concerned with setting
minimum parking requirements for every land use. The Planning Advisory Service of the
American Planning Association (1991) reports that it “receives hundreds of requests each
year about off-street parking requirements for different land uses–in fact, we receive more
requests year after year on this topic than on any other.” The aim of urban planners requir-
ing off-street parking requirements is to overcome the peak demand for each land use. As
a result, parking was free for 99% of automobile trips in the US (US Department of Trans-
portation, 1990). While urban planners insist on minimum parking requirements, they rarely
take the cost of parking into account. Shoup (1997) estimates the cost of an additional park-
ing space in 1991 at UCLA campus as $23; 346. He also underlines the social cost of parking
that arises from congestion and pollution externalities. In addition, excessive free parking
spaces deteriorate urban design and increase automobile dependency: Shoup and Pickrell
(1980) show that free parking causes more solo driving. Free parking reduces the market
price of parking and so inflates demand. Together with all the side effects of minimum
parking requirements, according to Shoup (1997), urban planning education does not pro-
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vide any instruction for setting parking requirements. Consequently, he suggests eliminating
minimum parking requirements.
Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) devise a model that justifies the common implementation
of minimum parking requirements in the context of shopping mall parking. They analyze the
parking behavior in shopping malls and find that the socially optimal lot size is always larger
than the lot size that a profit maximizing mall charges. They also show malls largely provide
free parking despite the cost of the vast amount of land devoted to parking. Moreover, they
find that free parking is socially optimal in a second-best sense. In fact, the first-best social
optimum is subsidizing parking, which is not implementable. In other words, the mall is
willing to insure the customers who leave the mall empty-handed by embedding the cost of
parking into the price of the good.
We extend the model of Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) by allowing for valet parking. So,
customers are provided two types of parking: regular and valet. The benefit of valet parking
to customers is that they do not need to cruise to find an empty lot and walk the distance
between the parking spot and the mall because the valet point is located just at the entrance
of the mall. The malls are aware that shoppers do not want to walk in a shopping mall’s
garage and are sensitive to the customers’ need for the availability of parking. Moreover,
not being able to find a close parking spot can be the cause of bad shopping experience or
even driving off (Grant 2011). The shopping malls are trying new ways to assure customers
close and in-easy-reach parking spaces. For instance, they deploy cell-phone applications,
overhead sensors and cameras to show customers empty parking spaces. An alternative
might be offering valet parking and they sometimes do so with an exclusive service of suited,
presentable valet staff. The mall developer Westfield group introduced valet parking with a
key fob feature, that is, to pull up your car before going to the garage. Nevertheless, to
minimize the waiting time, the mall is trying to replace a new way such as text message
instead of key fob. All in all, parking availability is known to be a significant factor on
customer’s shopping behavior and the malls are thus seeking better tools. In this sense, valet
parking seems to be a good alternative in terms of close space, exclusive service, limited (or
no) cruising. We incorporate these into the model by adding an extra utility associated with
valet parking.
Even though customers get some utility from using valet service, there are some factors
affecting the customers’ decision of choosing valet service over regular parking such as
difference in wealth levels, the utility from getting valet service, or the valuation of the good
sold at the mall. The valuation of the good sold at the mall can be seen as the most surprising
one to affect the parking behavior and we will provide the impact of it, together with the
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utility from using valet service, on parking behavior of customers. We will also concentrate
on welfare analysis and try to determine the cases in which implementing a valet service
would bring the highest welfare.
The model suggests that two types of customers exist who differ by their valuation of
the good sold at the mall. Note that the customers do not differ by their valuation of the
valet service or by their wealth. In our model, we focus on the effect of the valuation of
the good on parking choice. All customers have primarily two choices: going to the mall or
engaging in another activity. They all have the same utility from engaging in another activity.
However, their utilities from going to the mall differ because they have different valuations
of the good and they might prefer different kinds of parking, namely valet and regular.
Now, consider the mall’s problem. It is aware that there are two types of customers.
Therefore, it may offer two different types of parking to get the maximum payoff it can get if
the valuations are distant enough. If it offers only regular parking with the same price to all,
high types earn a higher surplus than do low types. So, when the customers have different
valuations, it can be optimal for the mall to provide different kinds of parking. In the end,
the mall maximizes its payoff by choosing the prices of parking and the good.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, Section
3 presents the model and solves for equilibria, Section 4 shows comments on welfare and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze valet parking. Parking literature mostly
focuses on traffic congestion, parking lot size, and parking fees.
Arnott and Rowse (1999) create a model of parking congestion to find an optimal parking
fee. They consider a city with spatial homogeneity located on an annulus. They assume road
demand to be exogenous, stochastic and time-invariant. The walking distance between the
parking spot and the destination point depends on the mean density of empty parking spaces.
The critical point is that people neglect the effect of their parking on the mean density of
empty parking spaces. In fact, it does affect the mean density and as a consequence, the
mean density of empty parking spaces becomes endogenous. Although they create a simple
model due to their assumption of spatial homogeneity, they end up with complex results.
They find that parking fee should be equal to the value of congestion externality imposed.
However, their model generates three equilibria which can be Pareto ranked. Thus, due to
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multiplicity of equilibria, the social optimum is not guaranteed even with optimal pricing.
Anderson and de Palma (2004) consider parking as a common property resource and
suggest pricing it in a monopolistic manner. They set up a linear city model with fixed and
exogenous parking capacity at each location and without pricing, parking close to destination
will be excessive according to their model. The solution they emphasize is the same as that of
Knight (1924), which is private ownership of parking areas –private ownership of common
property resources in Knight (1924) paper– and thus pricing them in a monopolistic manner.
To better understand their contention, let me modify Pigou’s (1924) “two roads” example.
Consider two parking areas, one of which is curbside and close to the destination but limited
in capacity and the other is a huge off-street parking thus being able to accommodate all
the cars without causing anyone cruising. Suppose that we have only these two options of
parking and both of them are free. In such a setting, the equilibrium will be such that the
cost of getting to the destination from the off-street parking area will be equal to the cost of
cruising caused by the marginal driver who preferred to take his or her chance on curb. In
other words, as more drivers look for a curbside parking space, cruising for parking increases
up to a point where it is equally costly to look for a curbside or off-street parking. After the
equilibrium is achieved, if a few people looking for a curbside are transferred to the off-
street parking, they would not incur higher cost but those who remained in curbside parking
area would benefit from decreased cruising time, that is to say individual freedom does not
always result in a socially optimum outcome. We can obtain the social optimum in this case
by levying a tax on the curbside that makes curbside and off-street parking equally costly.
Pigou thinks if the curbside is apt to private appropriation, the profit-seeking private owner
would charge a rent that would prevent the market from being a social optimum. However,
according to Knight (1924), the amount of charge by the owner of the road will be equal to
the tax that would otherwise be imposed by the government. My model holds with Knight’s
contention in the sense that the mall is managed by a monopolist private owner.
Shoup (1999) discusses why minimum parking requirements are fallacious and suggests
pricing curbside parking. There are two flaws of urban planners in setting minimum parking
requirements according to Shoup. They neglect the price on demand for parking and the
cost on its supply. What is most important in his paper is that he says minimum parking
requirements bundle the cost of parking into the cost of development, and thus increase the
prices of all the goods and services at the sites where free parking is offered. It is just as in
our model where the price of parking is embedded in the price of the good sold at the mall.
Arbatskaya, Mukhopadhaya and Rasmusen (2007) work on parking lot size. They point
that a high chance of cruising for parking at a parking lot eats up the payoff of customers
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from parking. The competition driving shoppers to find an empty parking space consumes
their entire benefit from parking. Hence, even though parking lots are hit substantially only
during Christmas, Black Friday or Super Saturday; the mall might want to provide parking
lots over the average demand. For instance, occupancy of 70% may indicate too small a
parking lot size given uncertainty in demand.
Russo (2013) brings an interesting approach to the topic. He analyzes the effect of in-
stitutional formation on traffic policy which is either road pricing or parking fee. He also
analyzes the effect of redistribution of traffic revenues on sustainability of the policies, and
the effect of financial support of central government on policy decisions of local ones. By
doing so, he gives a satisfying explanation to why congestion pricing may not be feasible
in some places. His model includes a central business district, a city and the hinterland
with two types of traffic charges: parking fee and road toll. He also covers mode choice:
individuals get a higher utility when travelling by car than public transport. His findings
reveal that road pricing and parking fees can be sustainable if the city council rather than
the regional government is the policy maker. This is because hinterland residents are, by
and large, car-dependent. However, if there is enough government funding to compensate
the local government’s loss from road pricing such as public transport fare reduction, road
pricing can still be feasible.
Fosgerau and de Palma (2013) suggest using a parking fee instead of congestion pricing
in order to control urban congestion. Congestion pricing is an application that charges drivers
on any road that is subject to congestion. It is applied in London, Stockholm, Singapore and
Milan. However, its application cannot be politically feasible in some other cities. For
instance, New York, Hong Kong, Manchester and Copenhagen once proposed congestion
pricing and then stepped back. In this case, Fosgerau and de Palma (2013) offer using a
time-varying parking fee at workplace. Considering congestion delay is strongly dependent
on timing of trips and by using Vickrey’s bottleneck model (1969), they show that that time-
varying parking fee at workplace can reschedule commuting as congestion pricing does and
as a result, it can be as efficient as congestion pricing in the places where congestion pricing
is not implementable.
3 The Model
The model is based on Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) model. A risk-neutral mall tries to sell
a good at price P in a unit time to risk-averse customers with a differentiable, invertible and
concave utility function u : R ! R+. It has two options of parking to offer to customers:
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valet parking with a cost of cv at a fee of tv and regular parking with a cost of cr at a fee
of tr. A customer visiting the mall can either purchase the good or leave the mall without
shopping, and then his or her probability buying the good is denoted by . If s/he decides not
to visit the mall, s/he engages in another activity from which s/he earns a payoff of r with
certainty.
The first difference between our model and Hasker and Inci (forthcoming)’s is that the
valuations of customers for the good sold at the mall differ among customers but they are
deterministic in our model. There are two types of customers in terms of valuation for the
good, namely low types with low valuation and high types with high valuation. In Hasker and
Inci (forthcoming)’s model, the value of the good to a customer is represented by a stochastic
variable. Since there are two types in our model, the mall would want to know the proportion
of high and low types, which are denoted by  and 1  respectively. The second difference
is that the mall has the option of providing valet parking service along with regular parking in
our model. We can really observe this new trend of offering valet service in some shopping
malls such as Westfield San Francisco, Westfield Chermside, Cherry Creek, Garden City,
The Florida Mall, and Dolphin Mall with a charge between 5 to 10 dollars. If there is no
option of offering valet service so that the price of parking and the good is same to all, high
types will definitely have a surplus due to their higher valuation of the good. In this case,
the mall would seek an instrument to extract that surplus, which is valet service. We already
talked about the benefits of using valet parking to customers; i.e., closer parking space and
no cruising. Therefore, we say a customer gets a utility from valet parking and we denote it
by x.
One problem with valet parking is that some people are concerned handing their key
over to valet. In fact, they have every right to be concerned about because Gocompare.com
conducted a study with 233 car insurance policies and reported that 49% of them do not
cover the damage while it is in control of valet (Gocompare.com). Despite this fact, what
we see in real life is that some customers continue using valet parking. In our model, we can
overcome this issue by reflecting the concern of people about their car while in control of
others on the utility gained by having valet service.
Different equilibrium strategies emerge based on the values of the exogenous variables
such as the valuations, parking costs, proportion of high and low types. There are separating
and pooling equilibria. In separating equilibria, the mall provides different parking services
to different types of customers. In other words, the mall separates customers in terms of
the service it offered. In pooling equilibria, the mall provides unique parking service to all
customers, which means this time the mall pools the customers in terms of the service it
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offered.
3.1 Separating Equilibria
In separating equilibria, the mall provides different parking services to different types of
customers. Not providing any service to a certain type can also be considered as a separating
equilibrium. For instance, the mall may want to keep the prices of the good so high that low
types do not visit the mall. This is the case in which low-type customers are not provided
any parking service simply because they do not come to the mall. So, a customer is provided
either valet or regular parking, or none. Keeping this in mind, we may have three different
separating equilibrium strategies: 1. valet by high types, regular by low types; 2. valet by
high, none by low; 3. regular by high, none by low. The proof of why a strategy in which
low types use valet and high types use regular parking cannot be an equilibrium is presented
in Appendix A.1. In addition, there are two other candidate strategies: valet by low types,
none by high types and regular by low types and none by high types. To see why they cannot
be equilibrium is trivial.
We now analyze each equilibrium configuration in turn.
3.1.1 Valet by high types, regular by low types
In this equilibrium, the best strategy for the mall is to provide both valet and regular parking
and set the prices of the good and parking such that high-type customers prefer valet parking
whereas low types do not. So, what leads customers’ different preference of parking is the
pricing strategy of the shopping mall. The mall sets the prices of the good, valet parking
service and regular parking such that a seperating equilibrium is reached, in which choosing
valet service makes high-types better off and choosing the regular parking makes low-types
better off. Since customers differ in their preference of parking by their different valuations
of the good sold at the mall, the payoff of the mall by each type of customer will be for-
mulized differently. If a high-type customer visits the mall, s/he will shop with probability
, which yields an expected payoff of P for the mall. s/he will also pay tv for valet service
which costs cv to the mall. Thus, the payoff of the mall from a high-type customer visiting
the mall becomes P + tv   cv. Now, consider a low-type customer. s/he will purchase the
good with the same probability  but s/he will pay tr for regular parking which costs cr < cv
to the mall. Thus, the payoff of the mall from a low-type customer visiting the mall becomes
P + tr   cr. Given that  proportion of customers is high type and 1    of them is low
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type, the overall payoff of the mall becomes
(P; tv; tr) = (P + tv   cv)+ (P + tr   cr)(1  ) . (1)
The shopping mall aims to maximize this payoff by choosing the prices in a way that both
types of customers visit the mall and they do not pretend to be each other.
From the customers’ point of view, there are initially two options: visiting the mall or
not. We will first deal with a high-type customer who uses valet service in a separating
equilibrium setting. If a high-type customer goes to the mall and purchases the good, s/he
gets the utility of u(vH P  tv) because s/he has the valuation of vH and s/he pays P for the
good and tv for valet parking. If s/he leaves the mall without shopping, s/he gets the utility of
u( tv). Considering that a high-type customer gets an extra utility x because s/he uses valet
parking service, the expected utility of a high-type customer from visiting the mall becomes
EH (ujP; tv) = x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) . (2)
Now, we can move to the low-type customer’s problem. Applying the same approach, we
formulize the expected utility of a low-type customer. If s/he goes to the mall and shops, his
or her utility will be u(vL   P   tr). If s/he does not shop, his or her utility will be u( tr).
So, the expected utility of a low-type customer becomes
EL (ujP; tr) = u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) . (3)
So far, we have determined the expected utilities of each type of customers from going to
the mall. If a customer does not go to the mall and engages in another activity, s/he gets a
utility of u(r). Since both types of customers have to visit the mall in this equilibrium, his or
her expected utility from going to the mall should be greater or equal to their utility from not
going to the mall. Thus, the following individual rationality constraints should be imposed
in order to ensure customers visiting the mall:
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r) (4)
u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r) . (5)
Equation (7) is the individual rationality constraint for high-type customer, and will be repre-
sented by IRH. Equation (9) is that for a low-type customer, and will be represented by IRL.
From now on, we will assume that both types of customer visit the mall since individual
rationality conditions are implemented. After ensuring that all customers come to the mall,
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another concern is to prevent different types of customers from imitating each other. What
we mean by imitation is that a high-type customer would like to use regular parking instead
of valet parking or a low-type customer would like to use valet parking. In order to avoid
those cases, the pricing strategy should be such that the utility of a high-type customer using
valet service should be as high as his or her utility from using regular parking; and the utility
of a low-type customer using regular parking should be as high as his or her utility from
using valet service. We will first focus on the former and then move to the latter. We already
know that the expected utility of a high-type customer using valet service is the equation (2).
We need to find out what utility s/he gets if s/he mimics low types and uses regular parking.
In this case, s/he will get the utility of u(vH   P   tr) if s/he shops, and u( tr) if s/he does
not. Besides, s/he does not get the utility x because s/he uses regular parking. All in all, the
expected utility of a high-type customer using regular parking becomes
EH (ujP; tr) = u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) . (6)
Then, we just need to implement the condition that the equation (2) is as high as the equation
(6), which we call the incentive compatibility constraint for high types (henceforth, ICH):
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) . (7)
To sum up, a high-type customer may want to pretend to be a low type and use regular
parking instead of valet service because s/he pays tv  tr less for parking. On the other hand,
s/he does not get the utility x from using valet service if s/he mimics low types. So, there
is a trade-off between choosing regular or valet parking. If the effect of valet parking utility
(x) dominates, s/he prefers valet service; if the effect of lower parking fee dominates, s/he
prefers using regular parking. In the current setting, the pricing strategy of the mall should
be such that the effect of valet parking utility surpasses the effect of less parking fee.
For the latter part, we already know the utility of a low-type customer using regular
parking, which is the equation (3). However, if a low-type customer pretends to be a high
type and uses valet service, his or her utility will be u(vL   P   tv) if s/he shops or u( tv)
if s/he does not. s/he also gets the utility x from using valet service. All in all, his or her
expected utility becomes:
EL (ujP; tv) = x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) (8)
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Now, we can define the incentive compatibility constraint for low types (henceforth, ICL):
u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) + x . (9)
We have defined four constraints so far, two individual rationality and two incentive compat-
ibility constraints. Lastly, we state that price of valet parking, regular parking or of the good
may not be negative:
P; tv; tr  0 . (10)
Now, we are going to find the prices. All in all, we have one objective function, four con-
straints and a bunch of non-negativity conditions. Solving an optimization problem with four
constraints might be troublesome. However, good news is that we can get rid of ICL and IRH
and we are left with ICH and IRL only. It is because ICL and IRH do not bind whereas ICH
and IRL do (The proofs are in Appendix A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5).
In what follows, we show that the mall provides the regular parking for free (See Appen-
dix A.6). In other words, it insures the customers who use regular parking to some extent
and so that the results of the equilibrium are consistent with Hasker and Inci (forthcoming).
Proposition 1 Regular parking is used by low types and provided free; valet parking is
used by high types and valet fee is always greater than zero in this equilibrium. Price
of the good is below the valuation of low types.
If tr is equal to zero, we can find the values of P and tv. Using the equation (5), we find
P :
u(vL   P ) + (1  )u(0) = u(r) =) P = vL   u 1[u(r)  (1  )u(0)

] . (11)
Considering the fact that the equation (7) binds, we can say that tv is always greater than tr
thus it is greater than zero. Positive tv may imply two different meanings. The mall may be
trying to attract high types in case the valet fee is lower than its cost, or the mall might be
trying to make profit from valet parking in case the utility from using valet service is so high.
3.1.2 Valet by high types, none by low types
In this equilibrium, the mall does not care if low types visit the mall or not and offers only
valet parking to only high types. So, it can charge a higher price for the good or valet service
compared to the previous equilibrium (valet for high, free regular for low; henceforth v-h,
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f-l). The question is for which good does the mall charge a higher price, for the good sold at
the mall or the valet? We will figure it out after solving the mall’s problem. In any case, for
this equilibrium to come true, it must be more profitable for the mall to increase the price of
the good or valet fee in return for losing all of its low-type customers.
Consider the payoff of the mall. A high-type customer visiting the mall yields a payoff of
P + tv   cv to the mall. However, low types do not visit the mall in this equilibrium, which
means the mall gets the payoff from  proportion of customers. Thus, the payoff function of
the mall becomes
(P; tv) = (P + tv   cv) . (12)
What remains is to implement the IRH:
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r) . (13)
Again, the prices must be above zero:
P; tv  0 . (14)
Proposition 2 In this equilibrium, valet parking fee can be either positive or zero, which
means the mall may be willing to cover the cost of parking. Price of the good is not
related to the valuation of low types but to the valuation of high types because low
types do not come to the mall. Therefore, if the mall does not care whether low types
visit the mall, it charges a higher price for the good.
In order to solve the problem, we start with finding the Lagrange function:
F (P; tv; ) = (P + tv   cv)+ [x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r)] . (15)
The FOC with respect to P is
@F (P; tv; )
@P
=   u0(vH   P   tv) = 0 (16)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0(vH   P   tv) = 

. (17)
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The FOC with respect to tv is
@F (P; tv; )
@tv
=   u0(vH   P   tv)| {z }
=
  (1  )u0( tv) = 0 (18)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0( tv) = 

. (19)
Since u0(vH   P   tv) and u0( tv) both equals =, we conclude P = vH . Substitut-
ing vH with P , we find tv =  u 1[u(r)   x]. This can be either positive or negative
depending on the values of r and x but the mall cannot charge a negative valet price.
So, if the formula gives a negative result, tv becomes zero and P is adjusted accordingly:
P = vH   u 1[u(r) (1 )u(0) x ]. Note that the price is higher compared to the one in the
previous equilibrium. This suggests that the mall increase the price of the good as long as it
does not care about low types.
3.1.3 Regular by high types, none by low types
It might be hard to imagine how such a model exists. Assume we are in the previous equilib-
rium (valet-high, none-low) in which the mall provides only valet parking to only high-type
customers. If providing valet parking is too costly compared to regular parking for the mall,
and then the mall might increase its payoff by replacing regular parking with valet service.
At this point, one may ask the question why the mall does not serve low types as well as high
types in this new situation. If it does not serve low types, it means that the mall finds it more
profitable to increase the price of the good and give up the payoff gained from low types. As
a result, there is a chance that we can obtain this equilibrium.
Consider the payoff of the mall. A high-type customer visiting the mall yields the ex-
pected payoff of P + tr   cr. As in the previous model, the mall earns this payoff from 
proportion of customers. So, the payoff function of the mall becomes
(P; tr) = (P + tr   cr) . (20)
Now, let me define the IRH constraint:
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r) . (21)
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Finally, we implement the constraint for the prices:
P; tr  0 . (22)
Proposition 3 Regular parking is provided free and the price of the good is below the valu-
ation of high types in this equilibrium. This means that if the mall provides free regular
parking instead of paid valet parking which is the case in the previous equilibrium, the
mall charges a lower price for the good.
In order to solve the problem, we start with finding the Lagrange function:
F (P; tr; ) = (P + tr   cr)+ [u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r)] . (23)
The FOC with respect to P is
@F (P; tr; )
@P
=   u0(vH   P   tr) = 0 (24)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0(vH   P   tr) = 

. (25)
The FOC with respect to tr is
@F (P; tr; )
@tr
=   u0(vH   P   tr)| {z }
=
  (1  )u0( tr) = 0 (26)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0( tr) = 

. (27)
Since u0(vH   P   tr) and u0( tr) both equals =, we conclude P = vH . Plugging vH
instead of P , we find tr =  u 1[u(r)] =  r which is negative. So, regular parking is
provided free. Making tr = 0, we recalculate the price:
u(vH   P ) + (1  )u(0) = u(r) =) P = vH   u 1[u(r)  (1  )u(0)

] . (28)
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3.2 Pooling Equilibria
In pooling equilibria, the mall provides unique parking service so customers are not differ-
entiated in terms of the parking service they choose. What distinguishes high types from
low types is their valuation. Hence for pooling equilibria to come true, the valuations must
be close enough to each other. If the mall observes a significant difference between the val-
uation of high types and low types, it might want to extract the surplus of high types by
increasing the price of the good not caring about low types and as result, customers will have
been separated. Of course, there are other parameters affecting the mall’s pricing strategy
such as parking costs, utility gained by using valet service, reservation value. Considering
there are two types of parking offered, two different pooling equilibrium settings may arise.
3.2.1 Free parking for all
In this equilibrium, valet service is not provided. Therefore, both types of customers must
choose regular parking. In this case, any customer visiting the mall and shopping with
probability  yields the expected payoff of P to the mall. In addition, each customer pays
tr for parking which costs cr to the mall. So, the expected payoff of the mall becomes
(P; tr) = P + tr   cr . (29)
The mall wants to maximize this payoff by choosing the prices of the good and parking.
However, the prices should be such that the model is sustained, which means all customers
visit the mall and they use regular parking. Since all customers are provided the same kind
of parking in this equilibrium, there is no need to implement the incentive compatibility
constraints. We still need the individual rationality constraints because we want to make
sure all customers prefer visiting the mall instead of engaging in another activity.
Consider a high-type customer first. s/he gets the utility of u(vH P tr) if s/he is happy
with what s/he finds out in the mall and purchases the good. Otherwise, s/he gets the utility
of u( tr). Note that one difference of his or her utility from the one in separating model is
that s/he pays tr for parking instead of tv. Another difference is that s/he does not get the
utility of x because s/he does not use valet service. So, the expected utility of a high-type
customer becomes u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr). For a high-type customer to visit the
mall, this expected utility should be as high as the utility from not going to the mall, u(r).
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So, the IRH constraint becomes
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r) . (30)
Now, consider a low-type customer. his or her utility from visiting the mall would be u(vL 
P   tr) + (1   )u( tr). Unique difference between the utilities of high and low types is
the valuations. So, the IRL constraint becomes
u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r) . (31)
As it is the case in all equilibria, the prices should not be less than zero because we assume the
mall does not subsidize parking or shopping. Therefore, we finally implement the following
conditions:
P; tr  0: (32)
Proposition 4 There can be such an equilibrium in which free parking is provided for all
and this is the same strategy in the baseline model by Hasker and Inci (forthcoming).
The difference is that here the price of the good is below the valuation of low types.
Since the valuation is a stochastic variable in the model by Hasker and Inci (forth-
coming), it does not make sense to compare between the two equilibria in terms of the
prices of the good.
The mall aims to maximize its objective function based on the two constraints and non-
negativity conditions. Fortunately, one of the two constraints IRH can easily be proven not to
bind whereas IRL does (See Appendix A.7). In other words, high types earn surplus because
they pay lower parking fee than they would be willing to pay.
Now, reconsider the mall’s problem. It deals with only one constraint and non-negativity
conditions now. The Lagrange function for the problem becomes
F (P; tr; ) = P + tr   cr + [u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r)] (33)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
The FOC with respect to P is
@F (P; tr; )
@P
=   u0(vL   P   tr) = 0 (34)
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and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0(vL   P   tr) = 1

. (35)
The FOC with respect to tr is
@F (P; tr; )
@tr
= 1  u0(vL   P   tr)| {z }
1=
  (1  )u0( tr) = 0 (36)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0( tr) = 1

. (37)
From the two FOC’s, we conclude P = vL. By plugging in the value of vL in the equation
(31), we find tr =  r. This result is exactly the same as found in Hasker and Inci (forth-
coming). So, when the mall does not provide valet parking, we achieve the same results in
Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) model. As stated in their work, the mall cannot subsidize cus-
tomers for parking. We have non-negativity conditions to prevent subsidization. Therefore,
the mall provides free parking to all customers (tr = 0). Now, we go back to the equation
(31) and recalculate the price:
u(vL   P ) + (1  )u(0) = u(r) =) P = vL   u 1[u(r)  (1  )u(0)

] . (38)
3.2.2 Valet parking for all
In this equilibrium, the mall provides only valet parking to all customers. The customers do
not have a choice to park without paying for the valet. This means that the mall gets more
payoffs by offering valet service to both low and high type customers probably in a relatively
low price. Otherwise, low types would not prefer to visit the mall.
The payoff function of the mall will be similar to the one in previous equilibrium in
which all customers are provided free parking. In addition, this time, the mall gets tv from
each customer for valet parking which costs cv. So, the payoff function of the mall becomes
(P; tv) = P + tv   cv . (39)
Now, we have to implement the individual rationality conditions. Consider a high-type cus-
tomer first. If s/he is happy with what s/he finds out and buys the good, s/he gets the utility
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of u(vH   P   tv), or else s/he gets the utility of u( tv). Note that one difference of the
utilities from those in the first pooling model is the parking fee. In the first pooling model,
they pay tn for regular parking whereas they pay tv for valet in this equilibrium. Another
difference is that s/he will get an extra utility of x because s/he uses valet service. Finally,
if s/he does not go to the mall and undertake another activity, s/he gets u(r). So, the IRH
constraint becomes
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r) . (40)
Consider a low-type customer now. All variables in the expected utility function of a high-
type customer above remains the same except for the valuation term. So, the IRL constraint
becomes
x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r) . (41)
In addition to the individual rationality constraints, we have to implement the condition for
the prices not to be negative:
P; tv  0 . (42)
Proposition 5 There can be such an equilibrium in which valet parking is provided for all
with a positive charge or zero depending on r, x and u. In this equilibrium, price of the
good is still below the valuation of low types but higher than the price in free parking
for all equilibrium.
With a similar approach as in free-for-all equilibrium, we can eliminate the IRH con-
straint because it does not bind (See Appendix A.8). That is why we can ignore the IRH
constraint while solving the mall’s problem.
Now, including the Lagrange multiplier, we obtain the function
F (P; tv; ) = P + tv   cv + [x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r)] . (43)
FOC with respect to P is
@F (P; tv; )
@P
=   u0(vL   P   tv) = 0 (44)
and by rearranging the terms, we achieve the following result:
u0(vL   P   tv) = 1

. (45)
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FOC with respect to tv is
@F (P; tv; )
@tv
= 1  u0(vL   P   tv)| {z }
1=
  (1  )u0( tv) = 0 (46)
and what we achieve after simplification is
u0( tv) = 1

. (47)
From the two FOC’s, we conclude P = vL as in the previous model and the one in Hasker
and Inci (forthcoming). When we plug vL in place of P , we find tv =  u 1[u(r) x] which
might be either negative or positive depending on the values of parameters r, x and the utility
function u. If it is negative, tv becomes zero and P = vL   u 1[u(r) (1 )u(0) x ]. Note that
price of the good is higher than the price in the previous equilibria. This means that when
the mall provides free valet parking for all, it embeds the cost of valet into the price of the
good sold at the mall.
4 Comments
We have defined five different equilibria. Now, the issue is determining the circumstances
under which each of the five is reached. We will now calculate the welfare as well as compare
customers’ and the mall’s share of the cake for each equilibrium.
We generate different cases by assigning values to the exogenous variables x, , vH , vL,
, r, cv, cr and we can reach each equilibrium as shown in Table 1 and Table 2. For Table
1, we define the convex utility function of risk-averse customers as u(m) =
p
100 +m
where m combines the valuation of the good or the amount of money paid for the good or
parking. The constant 100 is chosen to keep the inside of the square root positive. If the
customer shops, his or her utility becomes
q
100 + vH=L   P   tv=r; if s/he does not, it isq
100  tv=r. The former is higher than the latter in each equilibrium. Therefore, 100  tv=r
being non-negative makes 100 + vH=L   P   tv=r positive. In a sense, the fixed amount of
100 is a maximum value a customer would spend for parking. We will henceforth call this
amount the parking budget.
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x  vH vL  r cv cr P tv tr Eq:  U U=
case 1 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 0.5 2 1 194.94 1.02 0 v-h,f-l 18.50 10.14 0.55
case 2 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.9 0.5 2 1 250.05 0.50 n/a v-h,n-l 21.19 9.99 0.47
case 3 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.9 0.5 2 0.8 244.94 n/a 0 f-h,n-l 21.32 10.02 0.47
case 4 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 0.5 2 0.8 194.94 n/a 0 f-all 18.69 8.14 0.44
case 5 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 5 2 0.8 156.73 0 n/a v-all 13.67 8.34 0.61
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies under five different cases
One striking result from the Table 1 is that the mall offers valet parking to all (henceforth;
v-all) for free as shown in the last row of the Table. In fact, this result is compatible with
Hasker and Inci’s (forthcoming) model in which the mall wants to subsidize regular parking
and embeds the price of it into the price of the good sold at the mall. Here, the mall goes
beyond that and offers an additional valet service from which customers get a utility and
embeds the price of valet into the good. Using the same parameter values in the last row of
the Table, if the mall did not offer free valet but free regular parking to all, the price of the
good would turn out to be 144:51. However, it is 156:73 in the equilibrium where the cost of
valet is absorbed in the price of the good.
Let me explain how we formed the 10 cases in Tables 1 and 2:
Case 1: We started with assigning subjectively reasonable numbers to the exogenous
variables of the model: x = 0:05,  = 0:1, vH = 250, vL = 200,  = 0:5, r = 0:5, cv = 2,
and cr = 1. Then we calculate the equilibrium payoff of the mall under each strategy; i.e.,
v-h,f-l, v-h,n-l, f-h,n-l, f-all, v-all. We compare the equilibrium payoff of the mall and see
that it is largest with v-h,f-l. Finding the equilibrium prices and customer utility completes
the second row of Table 1.
Case 2: Now, we can spread to other equilibria by changing the circumstances. Table
1 shows how to move from one equilibrium to another by changing only one exogenous
variable. For instance, changing  from 0:5 to 0:9 moves us to valet for high, none for low
(henceforth; v-h,n-l) equilibrium from v-h,f-l. In fact, it intuitively makes sense.  represents
the proportion of high types. If it is 0:9 instead of 0:5, the mall becomes fancier in response
and it does so by offering v-all.
Case 3: From that equilibrium, we can move to free for high, none for low (henceforth;
f-h,n-l) by decreasing the cost of regular parking. It is reasonable because offering free
parking without valet might be more profitable as the cost of regular parking decreases.
Case 4: By decreasing  back to 0:5, we can achieve free parking for all equilibrium
(henceforth, f-all). Note that if the mall has more high-type customers, it tends not to care
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about low types.
Case 5: Finally, by increasing the reservation value, we can switch to v-all equilibrium.
Higher reservation value means better outside option. If customers have a better outside
option, the mall needs to try harder to attract customers and does so by offering free valet
service. Note that the mall’s offering free valet parking to all is not a general condition; as it
turns out that the mall charges customers for valet in the same equilibrium strategy of Table
2.
x  vH vL  r cv cr P tv tr Eq:  U U=
case 6 0.03 0.8 50 20 0.35 0.5 1.94 0.6 19.37 1.37 0 v-h,f-l 14.91 22.56 1.51
case 7 0.03 0.8 50 15 0.35 0.5 1.94 0.6 50.07 0.79 n/a v-h,n-l 13.62 22.36 1.64
case 8 0.02 0.8 50 15 0.35 0.5 1.94 0.6 49.37 n/a 0 f-h,n-l 13.61 22.37 1.64
case 9 0.02 0.8 40 15 0.35 0.5 1.94 0.6 14.37 n/a 0 f-all 10.90 29.07 2.67
case 10 0.02 0.8 40 15 0.35 0.5 1 0.6 15.08 0.33 n/a v-all 11.39 29.06 2.55
Table 2: Equilibrium strategies under five more different cases
Now, look at Table 2. This time the utility function of customers is replaced with u(m) =p
500 +m. Again, we start with assigning values to the exogenous variables and move from
one equilibrium to another by changing only one, but this time a different, variable.
Case 6: A higher parking budget relative to the valuations means that the good sold at
the mall is less significant to them than it was with the utility function for Table 1. As shown
in the second row of Table 2, v-h,f-l is the best strategy for the mall under the related setting.
Case 7: Consider v-h,f-l equilibrium. We had increased  on Table 1 to switch to the
next equilibrium which is v-h,n-l. Here, we apply a different strategy: decrease the valuation
of low types down to a point where the mall does not care about them. Then, the mall keeps
offering valet to its high-type customers but none for low types. By doing that, the mall can
increase the price of the good because it does not have to sell it to low types any more. Notice
that the price jumped to 50:07 (which is the valuation of high types) from 19:37 (which is
close to the valuation of low types).
Case 8: Now, decrease the utility gain by having valet service from 0:03 to 0:02. Valet
service is not that attractive to high-type customers now and as a result, they are offered
regular parking for free.
Case 9: At this point, we had decreased  in order to move to f-h,n-l equilibrium. There
is also another way: decrease the valuation of high types down to a point where it is close
enough to the valuation of low types so that low types are regarded by the mall and free
regular parking is offered to all.
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Case 10: Now, instead of increasing r in Table 1, decrease the cost of valet parking until
the mall is willing to offer v-all.
A noticeable finding from the Tables is that valet fee is never greater than its cost, which
means valet parking is offered as a loss leader in all the cases from 1 to 10. This leads us to
think that the mall uses valet service not to make profit but as a tool to attract customers to
the mall. However, this conclusion depends on the utility gained by using valet service. If it
is high enough, the mall can increase the price of valet over its cost and make profit out of
valet parking. In addition, we justify all findings of the model. First, regular parking is free
under each equilibrium. Second, the price of the good is less than the valuation of high types
in separating equilibria, less than the valuation of low types in pooling equilibria. Third,
each equilibrium strategy can be performed depending on the exogenous variables.
policy x  vH vL  r cv cr P tv tr  U U=
v-h,n-l 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 0.5 2 0.8 194.94 1.02 0 18.603 10.135 0.545
f-all 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 0.5 2 0.8 194.94 n/a 0 18.694 8.135 0.435
v-all 0.05 0.1 250 200 0.5 0.5 2 0.8 200.03 0.50 n/a 18.450 8.143 0.440
Table 3: Outcome of three different policies under a fixed setting
Look at Table 3. Notice that all the exogenous variables are controlled. Thus, we can
make a ceteris-paribus comparison between the three policies. The striking result is that f-all
is the least customer-friendly policy with U= = 0:435. Offering v-h,n-l brings higher share
to customers because U= increases slightly. In addition, v-all and increasing the price of
the good from 194:94 to 200:03 brings significantly a higher share to customers. In sum,
what the Table implies is that valet parking should not be seen as a tool to exploit customers,
it can be a positive solution for them in some cases.
One might question if the assigned values of the exogenous variables in Table 1 and
Table 2 are realizable. ICSC reports that Canadian shopping-center sales per capita reached
$8; 631 in 2011 (ICSC). Shoup estimated the cost per parking space at UCLA campus as
$23; 346 in 1994 dollars. Let me assume the average spending at shopping malls is similar
in the US and Canada. The price level increased with 51:75% between 1994 and 2011 so
let me say the cost per regular parking space is 23; 346  1:5175 = 35; 427:56. It was 1
in the first two cases on Table 1. By multiplying vH , vL, cv and cr with 35; 427:56, we find
P as 6; 906; 386:34. Note that P is not affected by x. Since 10% of people coming to the
mall shop, total spending per year is $6; 906; 386:34  0:1 = $690; 638:63 according to our
model under v-h, f-l equilibrium. We will not find disproportionately different results under
the other equilibria so let me apply this result to the real data and see if the assigned values
21
are reasonable. The interpretation of our finding is that if there was only one customer who
visits the mall and shops with probability 0:1 and there was only one good to be sold at
the mall, then the customer, on average, would spend $690; 638:63 in one year. Now, let
us go back to real world. Average spending is $8; 631. Therefore, the customer density
should be $690; 638:63=$8; 631 = 80:02, which means there should be 80:02 customers
on average in the mall at a moment. Considering that shopping malls range in size from
13; 150 to 2; 574; 505 sq. ft., we say that this number can be reasonable for some small-
scale malls. What about the variables in Table 2? When we follow the same process, we
find the customer density 106:04, similar to the former result. What about bigger malls?
Consider Mall of America which is the largest mall of the US. The mall has 135; 000 visitors
per day and each of them spends $105 on average (Prairie 2006). So, total spending in the
mall is $14; 175; 000 per day. We estimated regular parking cost to be $35; 428 per year, so
$35; 428=365 = $97 per day. Mall of America has 12; 287 parking lots indicating total cost
of parking is $97 12; 287 = $1; 192; 613. According to the parameters that we calculated,
we rearrange the variables and can obtain Table 4. What we should notice from the Table
is P = $14; 243; 684. This means that 135; 000 visitors purchase $14; 243; 684 in a day.
However, 0:1 of visitors make the purchase, so total spending per day according to our
model is $1; 424; 368. What remains is to find the number of visitors per day and compare
it with the observed value of 135; 000. Mall of America reports that average spending per
visitor in a month is $316 (Prairie 2006). Therefore, $1; 424; 368  30=$316 = 135; 225 is
the number of visitors per day according to our model. The estimated data is close to the
observed one. In conclusion, we show that the model is applicable to large-scale malls such
as Mall of America as the model is to small-scale malls.
x  vH vL  r cv cr P tv tr
10 0.1 20000000 15000000 0.5 75000 1500000 1192613 14243684 90418 0
Table 4: Mall of America case
Before moving to Table 5, let me define welfare under each equilibrium as follows:
W1 = (P; tv; tr) + EH (ujP; tv) + (1  )EL (ujP; tr) (48)
W2 = (P; tv) + EH (ujP; tv) + (1  )EL (uj r) (49)
W3 = (P; tr) + EH (ujP; tr) + (1  )EL (uj r) (50)
W4 = (P; tr) + EH (ujP; tr) + (1  )EL (ujP; tr) (51)
W5 = (P; tv) + EH (ujP; tv) + (1  )EL (ujP; tv) (52)
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where W1 is the welfare under the first equilibrium where high types are offered valet and
low types are served regular, W2 is the welfare under the second equilibrium where high
types are served valet and low types engage in another activity and so on.  represents the
profit of the mall and EH , EL are the expected utilities of high-type and low-type customers
respectively. We will represent the total expected utility of customers by U . In short, U
represents the share of customers and  for the share of the mall from the cake.
Now, look at Table 5. It shows the welfare from each strategy under the cases defined
in Table 1 and Table 2. For instance, consider case 1: the bold numbers are the welfare
if the mall plays the equilibrium strategy, e.g. 28:64 is the welfare when the mall follows
the equilibrium strategy which is v-h,f-l. If it offered v-h,n-l the welfare would be 21:75.
Comparing 28:64 with the other values in the column, we reach the conclusion that the
equilibrium strategy of the mall brings a higher welfare than does the rest of the column.
However, we cannot draw such a conclusion from case 4. The equilibrium strategy of the
mall which is offering f-all brings a welfare of 26:82, but we could have 28:74 if the mall
offered v-h,f-l. At this point, the assumption that the mall is in a suburban area so that it is
not a price taker but has a monopoly power steps in. Hence, it would set the prices itself and
offer f-all which brings less welfare to society but more profit to the mall. We can observe
similar situations in some other circumstances. For instance, look at the cases 4, 5, 6, 7 and
8 on Table 5. In all of them, there is another strategy which gives a higher welfare rather
than the equilibrium one. Note that in general, no strategy is strictly better than another in
bringing in welfare.
case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4 case 5 case 6 case 7 case 8 case 9 case 10
v-h,f-l 28.64 28.73 28.75 28:74 23:91 37.47 33.5 33.34 33.28 33.61
v-h,n-l 21.75 31.18 31.13 21.75 19.56 35.98 35.98 35.82 33.02 33.35
f-h,n-l 21.77 31.17 31.35 21.87 19.57 35.99 35:99 35.99 33.19 33.19
f-all 26.63 27.92 28.12 26.82 21.99 44 40:03 40:03 39.97 39.97
v-all 26.64 27.93 27.93 26.64 22.02 43:99 40:02 39:58 39.52 40.46
Note: Bold numbers represent the equilibrium strategy of the mall, underlined ones represent the
non-equilibrium strategies which bring higher welfare from the equilibrium one.
Table 5: Comparison of welfare obtained by playing five different strategies under each case
Now, consider the third column of Table 5 for case 2. We are talking about v-h,n-l
equilibrium strategy. It brings the highest welfare. Hence, this strategy is a candidate for
being a social optimum in a first-best sense because no free parking is provided. If a social
planner also finds it as the best strategy, we can confirm it as a first-best sense social optimum
with certainty. However, the social planner problem of this model is in the future agenda.
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Remember that the equilibrium that Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) gives us is a second-best
social optimum because the price of parking should have been negative but a negative price
of parking is not implementable. However in case 2, only valet parking is offered and with a
positive charge. There is one more candidate policy for being a social optimum in a first-best
sense, which is v-all. This policy does not provide free regular parking either. In conclusion,
there are two equilibrium strategies that are candidates for being a first-best sense social
optimum: v-h,n-l; and v-all. What is common for them is that free parking is not offered.
5 Conclusion
We have created a model of valet parking by which we made the first attempt to understand
the emergence of valet parking in shopping malls. We analyzed the circumstances in which
offering valet parking might turn out to be the optimal solution for the mall. We reached five
different equilibrium strategies: three of them are separating and two of them are pooling.
In separating equilibria, the equilibrium strategies of the mall may be setting the prices of
the good and the parking such that high types get valet, low types get regular; high types get
valet and low types do not visit the mall; and high types get regular and low types do not
visit the mall. In pooling equilibria, the equilibrium strategies of the mall may be setting the
prices such that everyone gets free parking or valet parking.
In all the equilibria, one thing is common: if offered, regular parking is free. That is why
we started calling it free parking instead of regular parking after Section 3. This finding is
consistent with that of Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) but it seems to be contradicting to what
many economists argue against minimum parking requirements that parking price should not
be considered independently of parking cost and demand. However in this situation, there
is a firm who is willing to cover the cost of parking. Not only shopping malls but also
independent retailers on street might be willing to do that in order to attract customers. To
sum up, we find an incentive to provide free parking. Note that our finding does not justify
the minimum parking requirements because we do not make any analysis about parking lot
size. It just shows that in some cases, free parking can be the equilibrium.
We extended the base model of Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) by adding valet parking
and diversifying customers to high and low types according to their valuation of the good sold
at the mall. What leads us to this extension is that shopping malls work hard to make it easier
for customers to find close and in-easy-reach parking spaces. They are aware that parking
experience may affect further visits of customers to the mall or bad parking experience may
even be the cause of driving off. That is why they invest in technology and deploy overhead
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sensors, cameras or cell-phone applications to help customers find a close parking spot easily,
or they offer reserved exclusive parking places by valet parking. The model is interested in
explaining the increasing number of malls offering valet parking.
An important finding of the model is a candidate for being the first-best sense social
optima. Hasker and Inci (forthcoming) model gives us a second-best social optimum. With
the extension of valet parking and customer diversification, free parking for all may not even
bring the highest welfare. There are five different equilibrium strategies the mall might want
to play and two of them can be a first-best sense social optimum because no free parking
is offered in them. If offered, the mall wants to cover the cost of regular parking and as a
result, the price of it turns out to be negative which is not implementable. In fact, it is a
similar case for valet parking. The mall is also willing to cover the cost of valet parking and
it does. Notice that in Table 1 and 2, we find valet parking fee smaller than the cost of it
and for those that remains positive, there is no need for non-negativity modification for sure.
However, without non-negativity constraint, regular parking always turns out to be negative,
that is why we modify it to zero. The equilibrium with no modification will be a candidate
for being a first-best sense social optimum. For this reason, there are two candidates: valet
for high, none for low; and valet for all.
We analyze the parking behavior of customers and pricing strategies of the mall through
the model. For instance, we say that when there are enough of high-type visitors, we most
probably face with separating equilibria in which only high types are served. This means
that as there are more high types around, the mall becomes classier, increases the price of
the good, draw back from offering free parking and as a result, serves only to high types.
This result can be obtained also when the valuation of low types is too small compared
with the valuation of high types. Then, it would be better for the mall not to consider low
types and focus on high types. We show that each equilibrium can be played under different
cases in Section 3 and each switch from one equilibrium to another gives us meaningful
interpretations as explained in Section 4.
A Appendix
A.1 Appendix A.1
Proposition 6 There is no equilibrium such that high types use valet parking and low types
use regular parking.
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The prices set by the mall must satisfy the conditions below:
x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(r) (A-1)
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(r) (A-2)
x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv)  u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) (A-3)
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)  u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) + x(A-4)
They are IRL, IRH, ICL and ICH respectively. Now, think of (A-1) and (A-4). It is easy to
see that right hand side of (A-4) is strictly greater than left hand side of (A-1):
u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) + x > x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) . (A-5)
Hence left hand side of (A-4) is strictly greater than right hand side of (A-1):
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) > u(r) . (A-6)
This means IRH does not bind.
Now, let me increase tr by . IRL, IRH and ICH still hold after the increase, only ICL
can be affected. Therefore, the mall can increase tr until ICL binds.
Consider (A-3) and (A-4). With the summation of them, we obtain:
u(vH   P   tr)| {z }
1
+ u(vL   P   tv)| {z }
2
 u(vL   P   tr)| {z }
3
+ u(vH   P   tv)| {z }
4
. (A-7)
Using the concavity of u and tv > tr, we say (3   2 > 1   4) =) (3 + 4 > 1 + 2), which
is a contradiction.
A.2 Appendix A.2
Proposition 7 IRH does not bind in the setting where the equilibrium strategy is v-h,f-l.
In order to show that IRH does not bind, consider the inequalities (7) and (5). Only dif-
ference of right-hand side of (7) (EH (ujP; tr)) from the left-hand side of (5) (EL (ujP; tr))
is that we have vH instead of vL. Since vH is assumed to be strictly greater than vL, the
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right-hand side of (7) is strictly greater than left-hand side of (5):
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)| {z }
right-hand side of 7
> u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr)| {z }
left-hand side of 5
. (A-8)
From the condition above, we can conclude that left-hand side of (7) is strictly greater than
right-hand side of (5):
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) > u(r) . (A-9)
Notice that this is IRH and we have just proved that left-hand side of it is strictly greater
than its right-hand side, which means that IRH does not bind, thus it can be eliminated while
solving the model.
A.3 Appendix A.3
Proposition 8 ICH binds in the setting where the equilibrium strategy is v-h,n-l.
Now, we will show that ICH binds. In order to do that, let us increase tv by . Since
tv does not exist in IRL, it is not affected by the increase. An increase in tv will decrease
right-hand side of ICL, so it still holds:
u(vL P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) > u(vL P   tv   ) + (1  )u( tv   ) + x (A-10)
Lastly, we showed that IRH does not bind, so  amount of increase in tv will not affect IRH:
u(vH   P   tv   ) + (1  )u( tv   ) > u(r) (A-11)
If IRL, ICL and IRH are not affected by the increase in tv, what stops the mall from increas-
ing tv? The answer is ICH. Since ICH binds, the mall cannot increase tv.
A.4 Appendix A.4
Proposition 9 ICL does not bind in the setting where the equilibrium strategy is v-h,n-l.
Given that ICH binds, we can show that ICL does not. Since ICH binds, we can rewrite
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ICH as:
x = [u(vH   P   tv)  u(vH   P   tr)] + (1  )[u( tv)  u( tr)] . (A-12)
If we rewrite ICL in the same way, it becomes
x  [u(vL   P   tr)  u(vL   P   tv)] + (1  )[u( tr)  u( tv)] . (A-13)
We will find out the relation between tv and tr now. Adding up ICH and ICL constraint and
making simplification, we obtain
u(vH   P   tv)| {z }
1
+ u(vL   P   tr)| {z }
2
 u(vH   P   tr)| {z }
3
+ u(vL   P   tv)| {z }
4
. (A-14)
From this inequality and concavity of u, we conclude tv  tr. In addition, we can intuitively
say that tv is strictly greater than tr, otherwise this equilibria in which high types prefer valet
parking and low types prefer regular parking would not exist. Low types would pretend to
be high type because they would pay the same or less for valet and get an extra utility of x.
Now, it is time exploit our assumptions that the utility function u of customers is monotone,
increasing and concave. The last term ((1  )[u( tr)  u( tv)]) is common in both of the
equations (A-12) and (A-13). So, we can ignore that part for now. For the rest, only differ-
ence is valuations. Since vH is greater than vL, inputs of the utility function u are greater in
ICH than those in ICL: 3 > 2 & 1 > 4:
Using the concavity of u and tv > tr, we say 1   4 > 3   2 because an increase from
vL to vH when the inside of utility function is with tv has a greater effect and does it with tr.
So, the left hand side of (A-14) is strictly bigger than the right hand side, which means ICL
does not bind.
A.5 Appendix A.5
Proposition 10 IRL binds in the setting where the equilibrium strategy is v-h,n-l.
Let me increase tr by  amount. IRH remains the same after this increase because none
of the terms in IRH carries tr. ICL is not affected by  amount of increase of tr because it
does not bind:
u(vL P   tr   ) + (1  )u( tr   ) > u(vL P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) + x (A-15)
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Lastly, ICH still holds because an increase in tr will decrease the right-hand side of it:
u(vH  P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) +x > u(vH  P   tr  ) + (1  )u( tr  ) (A-16)
Therefore, IRL binds so that the mall may not increase tr further.
A.6 Appendix A.6
Proposition 11 tr= 0 in v-h,f-l equilibrium.
In order to prove that regular parking turns out to be free, we will show that payoff of the
mall inversely related with tr. Derivative of the payoff function of the mall is
@(P; tv; tr)
@tr
= 
dP
dtr
+ 
@tv
@tr
+ (1  ) . (A-17)
Consider dP
dtr
first. We can obtain P in terms of tr from the equation (9). When we write P
in terms of tr, we achieve the following result:
P = vL   tr   u 1[u(r)  (1  )u( tr)

] . (A-18)
Taking the derivative, we find
dP
dtr
=  1 
(1 )u0( tr)

u0fu 1[u(r) (1 )u( tr)

]g =  1 
(1  )

u0( tr)
u0(vL   P   tr) . (A-19)
Note that vL must be greater than P because the minimum value tr can get is 0 and when tr
is 0 in equation (5), vL must be greater than P for the equation to hold. Keeping this in mind
and considering that u is increasing and concave so its derivative is decreasing:
dP
dtr
<  1  (1  )

=
 1

. (A-20)
Let me go back to the equation (A-17). Plugging the value above in the equation (A-17), we
find
d(P; tv; tr)
dtr
< (
@tv
@tr
  1) . (A-21)
So, if we show that @tv
@tr
is less than 1, payoff of the firm decreases with tr for the values of
tr greater than zero. Then, the best strategy for the mall would be to provide free parking
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as in Hasker and Inci (forthcoming). Consider @tv
@tr
then. Let me define a new function f by
putting all the terms of equation (7) on one side:
f(P (tr); tv; tr) = x+u(vH P   tv)+(1 )u( tv) u(vH P   tr)  (1 )u( tr) .
(A-22)
Using implicit differentiation,
@tv
@tr
=  
@f(P (tr);tv ;tr)
@tr
@f(P (tr);tv ;tr)
@tv
(A-23)
=   u
0(vH   P   tv) dPdtr + u0(vH   P   tr)( dPdtr + 1) + (1  )u0( tr)
 u0(vH   P   tv)  (1  )u0( tv) .(A-24)
We want to show @tv
@tr
< 1. Notice that (1  )u0( tv) > (1  )u0( tr) because tv is greater
than tr and u is concave. So, we just need to show:
u0(vH   P   tv) >  u0(vH   P   tv)dP
dtr
+ u0(vH   P   tr)(dP
dtr
+ 1) . (A-25)
Rearranging the inequality, we easily achieve u0(vH   P   tv) > u0(vH   P   tr) which is
true.
As a result, we have showed that payoff of the mall and tr are inversely related when tr is
greater than zero. Therefore, the mall provides free parking to low types in this equilibrium
in which low types prefer regular and high types prefer valet parking.
A.7 Appendix A.7
Proposition 12 IRH does not bind, IRL binds in the setting where the equilibrium strategy
is f-all.
Consider the inequalities (30) and (31), that is to say, IRH and IRL respectively. The sole
difference between these two constraints is that we have vH in IRH instead of vL that exists
in IRL:
u(vH   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) > u(r) . (A-26)
u(vL   P   tr) + (1  )u( tr) = u(r) . (A-27)
Since vH is assumed to be greater than vL, left-hand side of the inequality (30) is always
greater than that of the inequality (31). That is why we conclude IRH does not bind whereas
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IRL does.
A.8 Appendix A.8
Proposition 13 IRH does not bind, IRL binds in the setting where the equilibrium strategy
is v-all.
Left-hand side of the inequality (40) is always greater than that of the inequality (41):
x+ u(vH   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) > u(r) . (A-28)
x+ u(vL   P   tv) + (1  )u( tv) = u(r) . (A-29)
So IRH does not bind whereas IRL does. This is why we can ignore IRH while solving the
mall’s problem.
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